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Casenotes
DEFENDING THE INFORMERS: THE MEDIA'S RIGHT TO
PROTECT NON-CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE
INFORMATION FOLLOWING
UNITED STATES v. SMITH
I. INTRODUcTION
The First Amendment rights to free speech and freedom of the
press are arguably two of the most revered aspects of the American
way of life.' The free flow of information within the American me-
dia allows citizens to make educated decisions regarding almost any
issue of public concern.2 Americans also rely on the media for en-
tertainment.3 To compete for ratings, media organizations have in-
creasingly merged the goal of informing the public with the goal of
entertaining the public. Throughout the highly publicized OJ.
Simpson trial, for example, viewers were glued to their televisions
to hear a commentary about Marcia Clark's new hairstyle as much
as to hear about the trial.4
A further illustration of this merger is the development of tele-
vision programs such as 60 Minutes, Dateline NBC and 20/20 that
1. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 726 n.1 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931); DeJong v. Oregon,
299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959)). "We have
often described the process of informing the public as the core purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and a free press." Id. at 726 n.1.
2. See id. at 726 ("We do not question the significance of free speech, press or
assembly to the country's welfare.").
Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon
which an open society is premised, and a free press is thus indispensable
to a free society. Not only does the press enhance personal self-fulfill-
ment by providing the people with the widest possible range of fact and
opinion, but it also is an incontestable precondition of self-government.
Id. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
3. See id. at 727 (Stewart,J, dissenting) ("The press has been a mighty catalyst
in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among
public officers and e-lo-ees and generally informing the citizenry of public
events and occurrences .... .") (citations omitted). From the weather and traffic,
to the latest sports scores, the American media is as entertaining as it is informa-
tive. See id.
4. For an illustration of the media turning the O.J. Simpson trial into en-
tertainment, see Agence France-Presse, BBC Defends Payment for Interview with O.J.
Simpson, available in 1998 WL 2264292. Following his civil trial, BBC paid O.J.
Simpson sixteen thousand dollars for one interview. See id.
(295)
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present investigative reporting in an entertainment format. These
programs directly compete with pure entertainment programs dur-
ing prime time. 5
With the incredibly large number of people relying on the me-
dia, reporters must be reliable as well as entertaining and informa-
tive. To obtain reliable newsworthy information, reporters must
frequently rely on outside sources and investigative reporting pro-
grams depend on such sources almost exclusively. 6 While many of
these sources are willing to go "on-the-record," some wish to keep
their identities unknown. 7
Over the past twenty-five years, courts have grappled with
whether news reporters should be required to reveal their sources
and turn over relevant information to police, if such information
may aid in the prosecution of a crime.8 Specifically, courts have
debated whether news reporters are entitled to a First Amendment
privilege granting them a right to protect such information. 9
Recent large-scale media events, such as Kenneth Starr's inves-
tigation of President Clinton's involvement with White House in-
tern Monica Lewinski, have raised fundamental questions about the
current state of news reporters' First Amendment rights. 10  In
5. ABC's investigative reporting program 20/20 airs opposite popular en-
tertainment programs including Melrose Place, Seventh Heaven and Nash Bridges. See
T.V. GUIDE, April 10-16, 1999, v. 47 No. 15 at 128, 154, 180 & 226. CBS's 60
Minutes airs opposite the Drew Carey Show and The World's Most Amazing Videos. See
id. Dateline NBC airs at various times throughout the prime-time slots, competing
against such programs as N. YP.D. Blue, Dawson's Creek, Unsolved Mysteries and L.A.
Detectives. See id.
6. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (characterizing infor-
mants as necessary to news-gathering process).
7. See id. at 731 n.8 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Walter Cronkite has stated that
he "depend[ed] constantly on information, ideas, leads and opinions received in
confidence." Id. Sources wish to hide their identities for numerous reasons. See
id. Some want to avoid reprisal from the potentially dangerous individuals they are
providing information about, while others simply wish to avoid public embarrass-
ment. See id
8. See generally James C. Goodale & John S. Kiernan, Reporter's Privilege Recent
Developments 1995-1996, 461 PLI/Pat 955 (1996). For a discussion of the evolution
of the newsreporters' privilege since 1972, see infra notes 30-91 and accompanying
text.
9. Compare Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 721 (5th Cir. 1980)
(recognizing broad qualified reporter's privilege), with In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to acknowledge qualified re-
porter's privilege). For a discussion of the issues that have given rise to this debate,
see infra notes 30-91 and accompanying text.
10. SeeJane E. Kirtley, The Vanishing Reporter's Privilege: What's Gone, What's Left,
522 PLI/Pat 357, 366-67 (1998). Kenneth Starr's independent counsel investiga-
tion brought the issue of news reporters' privilege to the forefront of American
politics. The Starr investigation involved grand jury subpoenas of various docu-
ments and video footage from media sources, including outtakes from an ABC
[Vol. 6: p. 295
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United States v. Smith,11 the Fifth Circuit considered whether it could
require a reporter to divulge information provided by non-confi-
dential sources relating to ongoing criminal investigations, or
whether such information was subject to a qualified news reporters'
privilege under the First Amendment. 12
Section II of this Note discusses the facts of Smith.'3 Section III
discusses Branzburg v. Hayes,14 the seminal case pertaining to news
reporters' privilege, and details the various circuits' applications of
Branzburg within the "non-confidential" source information con-
text.15 Section IV discusses the Fifth Circuit's approach in Smith,
detailing the internal inconsistencies within the Fifth Circuit itself,
as well as the treatment of non-confidential information through-
out the courts.' 6 Section V discusses the effect that the Smith deci-
sion will have on the media's ability to disseminate entertaining,
informative and reliable information, and analyzes the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in light of decisions by other courts.' 7 Section VI
considers the potential impact Smith will have on the media's ability
to present investigative reporting programs that rely heavily on
outside source information, and the likelihood of reaching a resolu-
tion to the circuit conflict.' 8
II. FACTS
On March 21, 1996, fires destroyed the MacFrugal's Regional
Distribution Center (MacFrugal's) in New Orleans, Louisiana.' 9
Federal agents suspected Frank Smith, a MacFrugal's employee, of
interview with Susan McDougal and videotapes of Monica Lewinski and President
Clinton, belonging to a West Palm Beach television station, WPEC-TV. See id. at
366.
11. 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996).
12. See id. at 972. In Smith, a reporter refused to comply with a Rule 17(c)
subpoena seeking copies of an on-the-record interview with a criminal suspect. See
id. The Fifth Circuit refused to grant the reporter a First Amendment privilege.
See id.
13. For a complete discussion of the facts of Smith, see infra notes 19-29 and
accompanying text.
14. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
15. For a discussion of non-confidential information and the reporters' privi-
lege, see infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 92-153 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 154-85 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
19. See United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 965 (5th Cir. 1996). MacFrugal's is
a Los Angeles-based corporation operating 321 close-out stores in 18 states, under
the names "Pic 'n' Save" and "MacFrugal's Bargain Close-outs." Id. A close-out
retailer purchases leftover or discounted goods from manufacturers and sells them
at a steep discount on the retail market. See id.
297
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setting the fires.20 On March 27, 1996, Taylor Henry, a reporter for
WDSU-TV, a local television station, conducted a videotaped inter-
view of Smith in which Smith accused MacFrugal's executives of
conspiring to burn down the structure.2 1 Smith later consented to
a tape-recorded interview with Warren McDaniels, the New Orleans
Fire Department Superintendent, which the Fire Department gave
to the federal government.22 In a subsequent interview with the
Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), Smith told a some-
what different version of his conspiracy story.23
The government became suspicious of Smith's conspiracy alle-
gations after the ATF concluded that the second fire resulted from
an electrical overload, and not arson.2 4 Hoping to clarify the issue,
the government asked WDSU-TV to turn over both the televised
and un-televised portions of the interview.2 5
After obtaining the requisite approval, the government moved
the court to issue a Rule 17(c) subpoena for the un-televised por-
tion of the interview. 26 Believing it contained exculpatory evi-
dence, Smith joined in the government's request.27 WDSU-TV
responded with a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting a First
Amendment news reporters' privilege. 28 The U.S. Court of Appeals
20. See id.
21. See id. at 966. Apparently intending to spread his conspiracy allegations,
Smith contacted reporters at WDSU-TV, claiming he had information regarding
who had set the fires. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 966.
22. See id. Smith told McDaniels that "after the first fire occurred, he over-
heard the manager and assistant manager of the Distribution Center plotting to set
the second blaze, at the direction of the MacFrugal's Corporate Office in Califor-
nia." Id. at 965.
23. See id. Smith was later indicted and charged with arson. See id. at 965.
WDSU-TV subsequently aired a ten-second portion of the Smith interview, in
which Smith claimed to have overheard the manager and assistant manager plot-
ting to set the second fire. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 965. Although his face was dis-
torted in the footage, Smith was identified by name as the source. See id.
24. See id. Federal agents arrested Smith on April 2, 1996, and charged him
with setting the first of the two fires. See id.
25. See id. at 966. Despite a general willingness to cooperate with the prosecu-
tion, WDSU-TV refused to turn over any video footage absent a subpoena. See
Smith, 135 F.3d at 966. The government obtained a Rule 17(c) subpoena for the
aired portion of the interview, and WDSU-TV promptly complied. See id.
26. See id. To receive a subpoena for un-televised portions of video, the Attor-
ney General's Guidelines require prosecutors to first obtain the Attorney General's
authorization. See id For a discussion of the Attorney General's Guidelines, see
infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Rule 17(c),
see infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
27. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 967. While Smith initially joined the government in
its subpoena request, he neither joined nor opposed any of its appeals. See id.
28. See id. The district court granted WDSU-TV's motion to quash the sub-
poena, agreeing with WDSU-TV's alleged First Amendment privilege. See id. In
late July, the government filed a notice of interlocutory appeal from the court's
[Vol. 6: p. 295
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for the Fifth Circuit overruled the district court and granted the
government's subpoena request, holding that news reporters do
not enjoy a qualified privilege that would permit them to refuse to
disclose non-confidential information in criminal cases. 29
III. BACKGROUND
The law pertaining to the news reporters' privilege has roots in
both statute and common law. The following section discusses the
evolution of the relevant case law, beginning with Branzburg v.
Hayes,30 as well as the various statutory devices that states have used
to protect news reporters' First Amendment rights.
order. See id. The government, however, subsequently agreed to dismiss its appeal
without prejudice while the district court inspected the videotaped interview in
camera. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 967. After doing so, the district court entered a
second order affirming its initial decision to quash. See id. In support of its find-
ings, the court stated that the "government's interest in the interview was not suffi-
cient to defeat WDSU-TV's qualified privilege, as the videotape contained evidence
that was cumulative of what the government already possessed." Id. The govern-
ment reinstated its appeal to the Fifth Circuit on March 21, 1997. See id.
29. See id In ruling on the existence of a qualified reporter's privilege, the
district court relied almost exclusively on Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621
F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 628 F.2d 932 (1980). See United States v. Smith,
Crim.A.No. 96-117, 1996 WL 371702 (E.D. La. July 2, 1996). The district court
stated that "[a] reporter has a First Amendment privilege which protects his refusal
to disclose certain information, but the privilege is not absolute[,] and must yield
in some circumstances." Smith, 1996 WL 371702, at *2 (citing Miller, 621 F.2d at
725). Miller established a three-pronged test to determine "whether the privilege
of the reporter is overcome by other considerations." Id Under Miller, the court
must ask three questions: "(1) is the information relevant?, (2) can it be obtained
by alternative means?, and (3) is there a compelling interest in it?" Id. (citing
Miller, 621 F.2d at 725).
In addition to their arguments on the merits, WDSU-TV asserted several juris-
dictional and procedural objections. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 967-68. WDSU-TV first
attacked the government's right to appeal, alleging that the order was not appeala-
ble as a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and that the government was not per-
mitted to "avail itself of the appellate route set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3731." Id. at
967.
Title 18, U.S.C. § 3731, permits the United States to appeal orders 'sup-
pressing or excluding' evidence in criminal cases so long as the relevant
United States Attorney 'certifies ... that the appeal is not taken for pur-
pose of delay and that evidence is substantial proof of a fact material in
the proceeding.'
Id. The Fifth Circuit quickly dispatched WDSU-TV's argument, finding jurisdic-
tion pursuant to § 3731. See id. The court found there to be no basis for arguing
"delay," because the defendant neither opposed the appeal, nor made any com-
plaint of delay. See id.
WDSU-TV also argued that the government's filing of the appeal was un-
timely. See id. Because the government had timely filed its initial complaint and
voluntarily dismissed it without prejudice, the court found no failure to file a
timely appeal. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 967-68.
30. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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A. Branzburg v. Hayes
Any discussion of the news reporter's privilege must begin by
examining Branzburg v. Hayes, the Supreme Court's most detailed
holding on the subject. 31 In Branzburg, the Court ruled that the
First Amendment does not relieve reporters of a duty to give grand
jury testimony.3 2 Branzburg consolidated cases against three report-
ers who refused to reveal the identities of confidential informants.33
31. See id. at 665.
32. See id. at 709 (refusing to exempt news reporters from providing grand
jury testimony unless forced testimony would amount to government harassment).
While this case did not recognize an absolute privilege, it has formed the basis for
recognizing a qualified privilege. See infra notes 56-75 and accompanying text.
33. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709. Due in large part to President Nixon's
efforts to control subversive groups such as the Black Panthers, subpoenas to jour-
nalists had increased dramatically at the time Branzburg was decided. See Lee Le-
vine, COMMUNICATIONS LAWYER, Summer 1997. The Branzburg decision was the
consolidation of four cases involving three reporters. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at
667-68. One of the reporters refused to attend the grand jury proceedings, while
the other two simply refused to answer questions pertaining to their sources' iden-
tities. See id. at 668.
In the first case, Branzburg, a reporter from Louisville, Kentucky, witnessed
two drug producers synthesizing marijuana into hashish and subsequently pub-
lished an article about what he had seen. See id. at 667-68. In the article,
Branzburg stated that he had promised his sources that he would not reveal their
identities. See id. A Kentucky state court ordered Branzburg to reveal his sources'
identities at a grand jury proceeding. See id. After his refusal, a Kentucky Court of
Appeals affirmed the order, holding that Branzburg was not entitled to a privilege
under that state's constitution. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-69.
In the second case, Branzburg interviewed dozens of drug users in Frankfort,
Kentucky, and witnessed many of them smoking marijuana. See id. Following pub-
lication of this story, a trial court ruled that Branzburg was required to appear to
testify before a grand jury about what he had witnessed, but he was not required to
reveal the identity of his sources. See id. at 669-70. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
overruled this decision, holding that neither the United States, nor the Kentucky
constitutions protected Branzburg from revealing his sources. See id, at 670.
The third case involved Pappas, a Massachusetts reporter who visited the Black
Panther headquarters in Rhode Island. See id. at 672. The Panthers permitted
Pappas to enter their headquarters to report on a potential police raid. See
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672-73. In exchange, Pappas agreed not to divulge anything
he saw or heard within the building. See id. Pappas later testified before a grand
jury to what he witnessed outside the headquarters, but kept his promise not to
reveal what he witnessed inside. See id. at 673. The trial court, later supported by
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, ruled that Pappas was not protected by
any privilege permitting him to refuse to divulge what he had witnessed. See id. at
673-74.
The fourth, and perhaps the most important case, involved Caldwell, a San
Francisco reporter also in contact with the Black Panthers. See id. at 675. Caldwell
refused to appear before a California grand jury, arguing that his appearance
would drive a "wedge of distrust and silence between the news media and the mili-
tants." Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 676 (citation omitted). A federal district court de-
nied Caldwell's motion to quash the subpoena, but granted a protective order
allowing Caldwell to withhold the identities of any confidential sources. See id. at
677-78. Caldwell again refused to appear before the grand jury and was found in
contempt. See id. at 679. The Ninth Circuit later overruled his contempt charge,
[Vol. 6: p. 295
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The reporters argued that forcing them to produce their infor-
mants' identities would severely curtail their ability to function as
reporters.3 4 Due to its deterrent effect on informants, this require-
ment would limit the free flow of information that the First Amend-
ment is designed to protect.3 5
The reporters asked the Court to adopt a qualified news re-
porters' privilege, whereby a reporter could only be compelled to
testify before a grand jury if the prosecutor could demonstrate that:
(1) there are sufficient grounds to show that a reporter possesses
information relevant to the crime under investigation; (2) the in-
formation is unavailable from other sources; and (3) the need for
the information is so compelling that it overrides First Amendment
interests.3 6
The Branzburg decision produced only a plurality opinion.3 7
Writing for the plurality, Justice White emphasized that reporters
finding Caldwell had a qualified privilege to refuse to reveal confidential informa-
tion absent proof of compelling reasons to do so. See id.
34. See id. ("[R]equiring a reporter... to testify would deter his informants
from communicating with him in the future and would cause him to censor his
writings in an effort to avoid being subpoenaed."). The resulting "self-censorship"
would arguably threaten the dissemination of information throughout society. See
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679. Without the security of knowing their work will not be
subject to stringent subpoena requirements, news reporters may shy away from
reporting the most sensitive and pressing issues of the day. See id,
35. See id. The reporters relied on cases supporting First Amendment rights
to individual development and representative government. See id. at 680 n.17 (cit-
ing Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 145 (1967); New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960); Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 250 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722 (1931)). They also relied on
cases requiring official action adversely affecting First Amendment rights to be jus-
tified by an overriding public interest. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680 n.18 (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945); DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958)). Additionally, they consid-
ered cases rejecting overly broad means of protecting government interests that
unnecessarily impacted freedom of speech, press and association. See Branzburg,
408 U.S. at 681 n.19 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965); NAACP
v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147
(1943); Elfbrandt v. Russel, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966)).
36. See Branzburp 408 U.S. at 680. It is important to note that the reporters
made no argument for an absolute privilege that would grant them freedom from
testifying before a grand jury under any circumstances. See id Instead, they re-
quested a qualified privilege, under which a reporter would not be required to
reveal confidential information if the resulting harm of revealing the information
would be greater than the public's interest in that information. See id at 680-81.
37. See In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 793 (5th Cir. 1983) (analyzing plurality in
Branzburg). While five Justices joined Justice White's opinion, Justice Powell wrote
a brief concurrence and Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall and Douglas dis-
sented. See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
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have no special immunity from generally applicable laws.38 Justice
White stated further that the right to speak and publish does not
afford reporters an "unrestrained right to gather information."39
Traditionally, restrictions applied to the public have been ap-
plied with equal force to members of the media, despite any nega-
tive impact on potential newsgathering. 4° In accord with this
traditional view, Justice White refused to exempt news reporters
from testifying before grand juries regarding information relevant
to ongoing criminal investigations. 41
Although Justice White refused to apply a privilege, he recog-
nized that news reporters have First Amendment protections. 42
38. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. "Citizens generally are not constitutionally
immune from grand jury subpoenas; and neither the First Amendment[,] nor any
other constitutional provision[,] protects the average citizen from disclosing to a
grand jury information that he has received in confidence." Id. Justice White re-
jected the argument that confidentiality plays a major role in determining the
existence of a privilege. See id.
39. Id. at 684 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). In Zeme, an
American citizen (Zemel) attempted to have his passport validated to travel to
Cuba following the breaking of American diplomatic relations but was denied vali-
dation pursuant to a federal statute. See Zemel, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). In a district
court action, Zemel alleged, inter alia, that Rusk's refusal to validate his passport
violated his First Amendment rights. See id. The court quickly discarded this argu-
ment, stating that there are many instances of gathering information that are pro-
hibited without violating First Amendment rights. See id, The court explained that
while the First Amendment does permit the relatively unabridged right to gather
information, that right is clearly limited. See id.
40. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685. At common law, courts generally refused to
grant a privilege to newreporters from being compelled to disclose confidential
information in grand jury proceedings. See id. (citing Ex parte Lawrence, 48 P. 124
(Cal. 1897); Plunkett v. Hamilton, 70 S.E. 781 (Ga. 1911); Clein v. State, 52 So.2d
117 (Fla. 1950); In re Grunow, 85 A. 1011 (N.J. 1913); People ex rel. Mooney v.
Sheriff, 199 N.E. 415 (N.Y. 1936);Joslyn v. People, 184 P. 375 (Col. 1919); Adams
v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Brewster v. Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp., 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957)).
In Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., for example, a Massachusetts district
court refused to acknowledge a testimonial privilege from revealing a confidential
source in a civil libel suit against the reporter who published falsehoods about the
plaintiff. See generally Brewster, 20 F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957). The court reasoned
that without a statute specifically granting a privilege, reporters are subject to the
same duty to reveal pertinent evidentiary material as any ordinary citizen. See id.
41. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 692. Basing much of his analysis on the tradi-
tional importance of the grand jury, Justice White found reporters' obligations as
citizens to appear before grand juries far outweighed the media's First Amend-
ment interest. See id. at 688 n.23 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390
(1962) (footnote omitted)). Traditionally, the grand jury was regarded as the pri-
mary protector against the abuse of prosecutorial power. See id. The grand jury
stands between the accused and accuser, ensuring that the charges brought against
the accused have been brought in a reasonable manner and that there is adequate
probable cause. See id.
42. See id. at 681. Justice White acknowledged that the First Amendment
would clearly protect reporters against intrusions or restrictions on their right to
[Vol. 6: p. 295
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Specifically, Justice White argued that abusive grand jury proceed-
ings, or official harassment of the press designed to disturb the rela-
tionships between news reporters and their sources, would not be
tolerated.
43
1. Concurrence ofJustice Powell
The controversy surrounding the application of the Branzburg
decision focuses on the conflicting tests established in Justice Pow-
ell's concurrence and Justice Stewart's dissent.4 4
While Justice Powell agreed with Justice White's argument that
news people are entitled to First Amendment protection, Justice
Powell also emphasized the "limited nature of the Court's hold-
ing."45 Beyond these limits, Justice Powell described two situations
in which the Court should apply a privilege: first, where a grand
jury investigation is being conducted in bad faith; and second,
where a "newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a
remote and tenuous relationship" to the investigation. 46 In either
instance, a reporter is free to file a motion to quash, or seek a pro-
tective order.4 7 Justice Powell further stated that courts must con-
sider these limited situations on a case-by-case basis, balancing the
publish. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. He found, however, that the facts in
Branzburg displayed no such intrusion. See id. Justice White limited the issues to
whether reporters were under the same obligation as the average citizen to appear
before grand juries. See id. at 682.
43. See id. at 681-89. Justice White did not see abusive behavior in Branzburg.
See id- He held that requiring reporters to testify before grand juries did not re-
strict the media's freedom of speech or assembly, and did not restrict or impose
the publication of any particular type of material. See id. Rather, it simply required
newsreporters to comply with laws applicable to the average citizen. See id.
44. For a discussion of Justice Stewart's dissent, see infra notes 50-55 and ac-
companying text. Justice White's opinion is generalized and does not set forth a
specific test to determine the propriety of extending a privilege. See Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 665-709. The tests established in Justice Powell's concurrence and Justice
Stewart's dissent provide a more quantitative standard to determine privilege. See
id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell openly criticized Justice
Stewart's notion that requiring reporters to testify before grand juries was the
equivalent of government annexation of the m.cda - an "investigative arm." Id.
Justice Powell's concurrence appears to be a direct response to Justice Stewart's
dissent. See id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. See id. (Powell, J., concurring). For example, Rule 26(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permits courts to make any order necessary to protect a
party from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense
.. .. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (2). For a further discussion of the procedural safe-
guards to the reporters' privilege, see infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
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freedom of the press with the obligations of citizens to testify before
grand juries regarding criminal investigations. 4a
2. Dissent of Justice Stewart
Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, is directly at odds with Justice Powell's concurrence. 49 Justice
Stewart challenged Justice Powell's balancing test as threatening to
"annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of govern-
ment."50 Justice Stewart further argued that both Justice White's
opinion and the concurrence fail to stress the importance of confi-
dentiality to the effective dissemination of information throughout
society. 51
The dissent argued that governmental power to force disclo-
sure of confidential information would undoubtedly deter sources
from coming forward.5 2 Additionally, uncertainty as to how the
government would wield such power could lead to self-censorship
within the news industry.53
48. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell
noted that "[t]he balance of these vital Constitutional and societal interests on a
case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such
questions." Id. The court considers so many factors in deciding whether to grant a
qualified privilege that it would be extremely difficult to apply a bright-line rule.
See id.
49. See id. at 725-51 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (directly challenging Justice Pow-
ell's proposed balancing test). Justice Stewart initially referred to Justice Powell's
concurrence as a "crabbed view" of the First Amendment and criticized it for being
insensitive to the critical role of an independent press in American society. See id.
50. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725. Justice Stewart further stated that the applica-
tion of Justice Powell's balancing test would "in the long run, harm rather than
help the administration of justice." Id. Justice Powell argued that the reverence
with which the courts have traditionally treated First Amendment freedom should
itself be sufficient evidence that no such annexation would occur. See id. at 710
(Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Douglas also filed a dissenting opinion, arguing in favor of an absolute
privilege from revealing confidential sources. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 713. This
opinion, however, has not been the subject of much debate. An absolute privilege
has been almost uniformly rejected in favor of some form of qualified privilege.
51. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In support of this
argument, the dissent cited historical anonymous works, such as the Federalist Pa-
pers, that played an integral role in our nation's development. See id, at 730 (Stew-
art, J., dissenting) (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960)).
52. See id. at 731 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart asserted that sources
discussing sensitive issues, particularly in criminal matters, would be hesitant to
come forward for fear of reprisal or public humiliation. See id.
53. See id. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). The uncertainty arises from the traditionally broad
investigative powers with which grand juries have been invested. See id. (citing
Antelli, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153 (1965)).
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The dissent ultimately proposed its own balancing test,
whereby a member of the media could only be compelled to reveal
confidential sources where the government could show: (1) prob-
able cause to believe that the news person has information clearly
relevant to a specific violation of law; (2) the "information sought
cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of First
Amendment rights;" and (3) there is a "compelling and overriding
interest in the information."5 4
B. News Reporters and Non-Confidential Outtakes
After Branzburg, the federal circuits generally recognized some
form of qualified privilege protecting news people from forced dis-
closure of confidential sources.5 5 The Fifth Circuit granted such
protection in Miller v. Transamerican Press, and later in In re Sel-
craig.5 6 Miller involved a libel action against a magazine for printing
a story that falsely accused the plaintiff of mismanagement of pen-
sion funds. 57 The Fifth Circuit recognized a qualified privilege for
confidential sources that could be defeated only where the litigant
could demonstrate: (1) the information was relevant; (2) it could
54. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting). This balancing test was taken from
Garland v. Torre, a Second Circuit opinion refusing to grant a privilege to a re-
porter in a civil trial. See id. at 743 n.33 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Garland v.
Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958)). The Second Circuit noted that while report-
ers' confidential relationships are entitled to First Amendment protection, a privi-
lege will not be granted where the question at issue goes to "the heart of the
plaintiff's claim." Id.
Justice Powell criticized the dissent's proposed balancing test, arguing that
such a test would defeat the fair balancing advocated by Justice White and, in turn,
the "essential social interests in the detection and prosecution of crime would be
heavily subordinated." Id. at 724 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. Nine circuits have expressly recognized a qualified privilege, and of the
remaining three, only one has completely renounced the existence of such a privi-
lege. See Bruno v. Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Corp., 633 F.2d 583, 595-96
(1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 816 (1983); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir.
1980); LaRouche v. National Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986); Miller v. Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986,
992-93 n.9 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Farr v. Pitchess, 522
F.2d 464, 467-608 (9th Cir. 1975), wrt. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705,
714 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85
(6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to acknowledge qualified privilege).
56. See Miller, 621 F.2d at 721 (affording privilege in confidential source infor-
mation context); see also In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1983).
57. See Miller, 621 F.2d at 723. Transamerican Press publishes Overdrive maga-
zine. In June 1972, Overdrive contained a nine page article in which the author
alleged that Miller "swindled" 1.6 million dollars from the Teamsters' pension
fund through fraudulent loans. See icL
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not be obtained by alternative means; and (3) there was a compel-
ling interest in that information. 58
In re Selcraig involved a libel suit against a school district for
allegedly publishing stigmatizing falsehoods about a discharged
school official. 59 A confidential source leaked the charges against
the official to a local reporter who published the charges.60 The
official sought disclosure of the source's name and the Fifth Circuit
refused, stating that such disclosure would offend the reporter's
First Amendment rights. 61
Courts have been far less consistent in applying a privilege to
non-confidential outtakes.62 The law in this area is relatively unde-
veloped because very few cases deal specifically with outtakes.63
Prior to 1998, the Fifth Circuit had not ruled on whether non-
confidential sources should receive First Amendment protection. 64
Despite lack of precedent, the Fifth Circuit doubted whether a re-
58. See id. at 726.
59. See Selcraig, 705 F.2d at 792.
60. See id. Paul Trautman, a school administrator, was employed under a one-
year contract to replace an employee who had been suspended for alleged misuse
of funds. See id. Soon after commencing employment, a custodial employee re-
ported "derogatory information" about Trautman. See id. On October 4, 1979,
Selcraig, a reporter for the Dallas Morning News, published an article detailing the
allegations against Trautman. See id.
61. See Selcraig, 705 F.2d at 789. The Fifth Circuit expanded the scope of the
Miller test beyond civil libel suits and applied it in determining whether Selcraig
would have a testimonial privilege. See id. at 798-99.
The Sixth Circuit stands alone in refusing to acknowledge a privilege in the
confidential context. See generally In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580 (6th
Cir. 1987). In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Bradley Stone, a television reporter, was
held in contempt of court and taken into custody after refusing to comply with a
subpoena duces tecum. See id. at 581. The subpoena ordered the release of video
tapes containing footage gathered during an investigative report on inner city
youth gangs. See id. The court sought the tapes to identify a member of the gang
who was suspected of murdering a Detroit police officer during the period in
which Stone was filming. See id at 582. As a condition of filming the gang mem-
bers, Stone agreed not to disclose portions of the video that included their faces.
See id. In arguing for a qualified privilege, Stone relied heavily on Justice Stewart's
dissent. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d at 582.
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to strictly applyJustice White's view. See id.
at 584. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged other circuits' reliance on Justice Powell's
concurrence. See id. at 585. However, they accused those courts of reading into
the concurrence and ultimately rewriting Justice White's majority opinion. See id.
62. See Alison Lynn Tuley, Outtakes, Hidden Cameras, and the First Amendment: A
Reporter's Privilege, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1817, 1818 (1997). "Outtake" is the term
commonly used to describe video or audio footage recorded, but not included, in
a broadcast or other publication. See id.
63. See id at 1825.
64. See Holland v. Centennial Homes, Inc., 22 MEDtA L. REP. 2270, 2273 (N.D.
Tex. 1993) ("[T]he Fifth Circuit has yet to establish guidelines with regard to dis-
covery of non-confidential information....").
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porter's privilege could be justified for non-confidential sources. 65
In Pressey v. Patterson,66 the Fifth Circuit noted in dicta that it would
be difficult to extend protection to information procured on-the-
record without the expectation of confidentiality. 67
Despite the Fifth Circuit's doubts regarding a non-confidential
reporter's privilege, lower courts within that circuit extended the
privilege to the non-confidential context.68 In Brinston v. Dunn,69
the Southern District of Mississippi limited questioning of reporters
to the content of published work product and the truthfulness and
accuracy of statements made therein.70 The court also refused to
permit questions pertaining to unpublished information in the re-
porters' possession. 71
In Holland v. Centennial Homes, Inc.,72 the Northern District of
Texas quashed a subpoena seeking tapes of non-confidential inter-
views with the plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit.73 The magis-
trate noted Branzburg, and stated that private litigants ordinarily
should not be permitted to use the media as an "investigative
tool."
7 4
65. See Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1022 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990) (expres-
sing "strong doubts" whether privilege was warranted without confidentiality).
66. 898 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990).
67. See id, In Pressey, a corrupt police officer (Patterson) shot William Pressey
in the head after a routine traffic stop. See id. Following the incident, the Houston
Post interviewed Sergeant Steven Reiser, a supervisor and spokesman for the Hous-
ton Police Department's internal affairs division. See i. at 1020. Reiser and the
Post reporter made tapes of the interview. See id. Following the story's publication,
Reiser transferred out of the internal affairs division and subsequently destroyed
his copies of the tapes. See Pressey, 898 F.2d at 1020. The trial court refused to
compel the Post reporter to turn over his tape of the interview, acknowledging a
First Amendment reporters' privilege. See id. The Fifth Circuit upheld the trial
court's ruling. See id.
68. See Brinston v. Dunn, 919 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (instituting privi-
lege despite lack of confidentiality); Holland v. Centennial Homes, Inc., 22 MEDIA
L. Rrp. 2270 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (same).
69. 919 F. Supp. 240 (S.D. Miss. 1996).
70. See id.
71. See id
72. 22 MEDIA L. REP. 2270 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
73. See id. at 2276.
74. Id. at 2272 ("State and federal authorities are not free to annex the news
media as an investigative arm of the government. It logically follows that private
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C. Statutory Safeguards for the Reporter's Privilege
1. Criminal Procedure
Courts are restricted in their ability to issue subpoenas against
the media by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, regardless
of whether the federal circuits recognize a qualified privilege in
criminal matters. 75 A party conducting criminal discovery must
comply with Rule 17(c), which permits discovery only of materials
that are "admissible as evidence." 76 Although material may be sub-
ject to subpoena at trial, this does not necessarily entitle the party to
pre-trial production and inspection. 77 The litigant must first
demonstrate: "(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant;
(2) they are not otherwise reasonably procurable; (3) the party can-
not properly prepare for trial without the material, and that the
failure to obtain the material may unreasonably delay the trial; and
(4) that the application is not a 'fishing expedition.' 78
Rule 17(c) does not permit discovery of potential impeach-
ment materials prior to the testimony of a witness. 79 Even if evi-
dence is clearly admissible, the court will not enforce a Rule 17(c)
subpoena until it is apparent that the defendant will actually stand
trial.80
75. See Goodale & Kiernan, supra note 8, at 967-68.
76. United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1126 (1981). In Cuthbertson, CBS television sought to protect outtakes from an
interview taped on their news program 60 Minutes. See id at 143. The court relied
on Riley v. City of Chester and ultimately upheld a privilege. See itdL (citing Riley v.
City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1979)). Rule 17(c) states that:
A subpoena may... command the person to whom it is directed to pro-
duce the books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein.
The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena
if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may di-
rect that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena
be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the
time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their produc-
tion permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof
to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
77. See Goodale & Kiernan, supra note 8, at 968.
78. Id. at 968 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)). Nixon
involved the prosecution of government officials for conspiracy to defraud the
United States. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 683. The special prosecutor issued a sub-
poena duces tecum to President Nixon, seeking the release of tape recordings and
documents relating to the President's conversations with his aids and advisors. See
id,
79. See Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d at 189.
80. See Goodale & Kiernan, supra note 8, at 968-69.
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2. Civil Procedure
In civil matters, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide
significant First Amendment protection. Rule 26(b) permits a
court to grant or deny discovery, on its own initiative or upon a
motion for a protective order, where: (1) the discovery documents
sought are "evidentiary and relevant;" (2) the party had ample time
to obtain the requested information through discovery; and (3) the
burden or expense of the discovery outweighs its likely benefit.8 '
3. The Attorney General's Guidelines
In 1973, the Attorney General issued guidelines to regulate the
government's power to subpoena members of the media.82 The
guidelines were an effort to limit forms of compulsory process that
might conflict with the media's right to free press. They require
courts to balance the public interest in the free dissemination of
81. See id. at 969. Rule 26(b) states:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is being
sought, accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith
conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort
to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good cause shown,
the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relat-
ing to a deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be
taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or
expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that the dislosure or
discovery not be had; (2) that the disclosure or discovery may be had only
on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by method of discovery
other than that selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain
matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the disclosure or discov-
ery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no
one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposi-
tion, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a
trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be revealed or be revealed only in a designated way; and
(8) that the parties simultaneously file specified documents or informa-
tion enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court.
If the motion for protective order is denied in whole or in part, the court
may, on such terms and conditions as are just, order that any party or
other person provide or permit discovery.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
82. See ge-waly 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1973). The guideine, are preceded by the
following policy statement:
Because freedom of the press can be no broader than the freedom of
reporters to investigate and report the news, the prosecutorial power of
the government should not be used in such a way that it impairs a re-
porter's responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial public
issues. This policy statement is thus intended to provide protection for
the news media from forms of compulsory process, whether civil or crimi-
nal, which might impair the news gathering function.
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information against the government interest in effective law en-
forcement and the fair administration of justice.83 Before under-
taking the balancing test, however, the court must first determine
whether the government adequately investigated all reasonable al-
ternative sources of the information sought.8 4 If the court deter-
mines that requiring a reporter to comply with the subpoena would
result in unnecessarily duplicative evidence, the subpoena request
should be denied.85
4. State Shield Laws
In Branzburg, the Supreme Court invited the states to promul-
gate their own laws if they wished to afford reporters protection
beyond that provided by the First Amendment.86 Such statutes are
commonly referred to as "shield laws."8 7 The scope of the protec-
tion provided under shield laws varies greatly between states.88
Some states provide an absolute reporters' privilege while others
apply a qualified privilege. 89 Shield laws also vary in the informa-
tion they protect, with some states protecting only confidential
sources and others extending protection to non-confidential
information.90
83. Id. § 50.10(a).
84. Id. § 50.10(b).
85. See United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1982), affJd 730
F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1984) (quashing subpoena for failure to exhaust alternative
sources).
86. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
87. Goodale et al., Reporter's Privilege Cases, 421 PLI/Pat 63 (1995). States gen-
erally design shield laws to prevent the government from encroaching upon re-
porters' newsgathering power. See id.
88. Compare Steaks Unlimited, Inc. v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980) (discussing Pennsylvania's shield law providing for abso-
lute privilege) and Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14
(1984) (discussing California's statute providing absolute privilege for unpub-
lished materials), with NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2A:84A-21-29 (1980) (New Jersey's statute
providing only qualified privilege generally, and absolute privilege in civil libel
actions).
89. Compare Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d 14 (pro-
viding absolute privilege), with McNabb v. Oregonian Publ'g Co., 685 P.2d 458
(Or. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing Oregon's qualified privilege under its shield law).
90. Compare Williams v. ABC, 96 F.R.D. 658, 669 (W.D. Ark. 1983) (Arkansas
shield law protects sources, not outtakes), with Burials v. Minneapolis Star and
Tribune, 8 MEDIA L. REP. 1653 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1982) (Minnesota shield law pro-
tects unpublished material even if non-confidential).
[Vol. 6: p. 295
16
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol6/iss2/3
1999] MEDIA'S RIGHT TO PROTECT SOURCE INFORMATION 311
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The narrative analysis of United States v. Smith9 ' first discusses
the court's refusal to recognize an "institutional" news reporters'
privilege.9 2 It then analyzes the application of Branzburg beyond
grand jury proceedings. 93 Next, this section explores whether the
Fifth Circuit is bound by Miller v. Transamerican Press.9 4 The analysis
concludes with a discussion of the distinction between published
and unpublished source information. 95
In Smith, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered
whether the First Amendment protects news reporters against gov-
ernment subpoenas that request the disclosure of non-confidential
video outtakes relevant to ongoing criminal investigations. 96 The
reporters argued for a qualified reporters' privilege, stating that dis-
closure of non-confidential source information would unduly bur-
den the media's First Amendment rights. 97 In concluding that no
such privilege should be found, the Fifth Circuit addressed three
issues: (1) whether the media, as an "institution," is entitled to a
qualified privilege; (2) whether Justice Powell's balancing test set
forth in Branzburg applies only to grand jury proceedings; and, most
importantly, (3) whether the Fifth Circuit was bound by the existing
privilege established in Miller.98
91. 135 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1998).
92. For a discussion of the propriety of an "institutional" newsreporters' privi-
lege, see infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
93. For a discussion of the application of Branzburg beyond grand jury pro-
ceedings, see infra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of the precedential effect of Miller, see infra notes 129-38
and accompanying text.
95. For a discussion of the distinction between published and unpublished
source information, see infra notes 143-53.
96. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 968-72. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana granted a motion to quash a Rule 17(c) subpoena.
See id at 966-67. The subpoena requested WDSU-TV, a local New Orleans televi-
sion station, to turn over a copy of the outtakes from a videotaped interview with
rFrank Smt h, the prime suspect in a then ongoingr criminal investigation. See id.
For a discussion of the subpoena requirements under Rule 17(c), see supra notes
76-82.
97. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 969. WDSU-TV relied on the decisions of several
other circuits that upheld a qualified privilege for "non-confidential" information.
See Smith, 1996 WL 371702 at *1 (E.D. La. 1996) (citing United States v. Cuthbert-
son, 630 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d
1176, 1180-82 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983)).
98. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 969-72. For a discussion of the facts of Miller, see
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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A. The Media's Right to an "Institutional" Privilege
WDSU-TV, a New Orleans television station, argued for a quali-
fied reporters' privilege.99 The station asserted that the media, as
an institution, was entitled to a privilege protecting it from any un-
due burden on its First Amendment rights. 10 0 WDSU-TV argued
that absent such a privilege, prosecutors would "'annex' the news
media as an 'investigative arm of the government."10 1 As a result,
future sources may fear the media's close involvement with the gov-
ernment and hesitate to come forward with information.10 2 This
hesitancy, argued WDSU-TV, would severely hinder the media's
ability to garner credible and newsworthy information.10l
In addition, WDSU-TV asserted that without a privilege, crimi-
nal discovery requests would inundate the media. 10 4 Such requests
would strain media resources, making it difficult to provide the
public with current information. 0 5 Rather than comply with such
requests, the media could simply destroy work-product after it is
printed or aired, which would eliminate valuable archival foot-
age.10 6 Fearing potential involvement in criminal litigation, WDSU-
TV argued that the media might avoid reporting on sensitive
issues.107
99. See id. at 969.
100. See id. WDSU-TV likened their proposed privilege to the attorney work-
product privilege, which is "designed to promote effective representation of cli-
ents, and the executive privilege, intended to aid the operation of the executive
branch." Id.
101. Id. at 969 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, pointed out that Justice
White's opinion in Branzburg virtually ignores the importance of an independent
press in American society. See id. In a lengthy footnote to his concurrence,Justice
Powell addresses Justice Stewart's assertions, alleging that Stewart's approach
would undermine the "essential societal interest in the detection and prosecution
of crime ..... " Id. at 724 (Powell, J., concurring).




106. See id. WDSU-TV cited no empirical evidence supporting this destruc-
tion of archival footage theory. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 971.
107. See id. at 970. The Fifth Circuit noted that other circuits considered simi-
lar arguments supporting the extension of a reporter's privilege to non-confiden-
tial information. See id. at n.2 (citing Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1294-95 (9th
Cir. 1993) (extending qualified privilege without regard to confidentiality); United
States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (same); von Bulow v. von
Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. LaRouche Cam-
paign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1998) (acknowledging privilege but finding it
insufficient to outweigh the government's interest).
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WDSU-TV's argument for an "institutional" privilege did not
persuade the Fifth Circuit.108 The court relied almost exclusively
on Branzburg, stating that neither the plurality opinion nor Justice
Powell's concurrence supported the type of privilege that WDSU-
TV was seeking.' 0 9 While the court recognized that other circuits
have adopted a broad view of the reporters' privilege, the Fifth Cir-
cuit adopted a more narrow view. 110 The narrow view, set forth in
Justice Powell's concurrence, limits the news reporters' privilege to
intentional government harassment."' The court stated that short
of intentional government harassment, the media bears the same
burden of producing evidence of criminal wrongdoing as any other
citizen. 112
Although the court acknowledged the arguments supporting a
privilege for confidential source information, it quickly dismissed
the remainder of WDSU-TV's institutional privilege arguments."13
The court declined to find that press interests outweighed the gov-
ernment interest in prosecuting Smith as a criminal defendant be-
cause Smith voluntarily gave his interview and aided the
prosecution in attempts to procure the footage for trial. 114
The court firmly rejected WDSU-TV's argument that criminal
discovery would transform the media into an investigative arm of
the government, finding little reason to fear that on-the-record in-
formants would avoid the media for fear that information would be
108. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 970.
109. See id. (strictly construing Justices White and Powell's opinions in Branz-
burg).
110. See id. at 971.
111. See id; see also LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d at 1182 (adopting broad inter-
pretation of Justice Powell's concurrence); Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147 (same).
For a complete discussion of Justice Powell's concurrence, see supra notes 44-49
and accompanying text.
112. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 971. The court noted Ninth and Sixth Circuit deci-
sions which narrowly interpreted Justice Powell's concurrence as applying only to
the harassment of newsmen. See i&. at 969 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5
F.3d 397, 401 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 587-88
(6th Cir. 1987)).
113. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 969. The Fifth Circuit supported its decision to
reject an "institutional" privilege by comparing the facts with those of Branzburg.
See id. The Fifth Circuit believed that the Branzburg arguments favoring an institu-
tional privilege were stronger than those in Smith. See id. The Fifth Circuit did not
grant the institutional privilege largely because the Supreme Court rejected the
privilege under Branzburg's much more compelling circumstances. See id.
114. See id. The Fifth Circuit distinguished the Branzburg facts because those
reporters sought to protect confidential information. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 969.
WDSU-TV was trying to protect non-confidential information that had been given
"on-the-record" and with the expectation that thousands of viewers may hear it. See
id
19
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given to the government. 11 5 The court found that the informants
did not expect confidentiality for their information given on-the-
record because they knew that such information could potentially
be aired before the general public.11 6 Although the court recog-
nized that complying with discovery requests may take valuable time
and resources, it found that the press is no worse off than any other
individual possessing information relevant to criminal proceedings,
and that any burden felt by the press would be merely incidental.
1 17
B. Application Beyond Grand Jury Proceedings
WDSU-TV also asserted that the Branzburg balancing test ap-
plied solely to grand jury proceedings. 1 8 WDSU-TV relied on Riley
v. City of Chester,119 in which the Third Circuit refused to extend
Branzburg beyond the context of grand jury proceedings.' 20 In
Riley, a mayoral candidate filed a civil action against his election
opponent and several other city employees for leaking false infor-
mation to the press regarding his personal life.121 The Third Cir-
cuit upheld the news reporters' privilege and refused to require the
reporters to reveal the source of the leaked information. 122
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Riley decision and refused
to apply the Third Circuit's view. 123 The Fifth Circuit emphasized
the importance of effective law enforcement.1 24 Citing United States
v. Nixon, the court found that granting reporters the privilege to
withhold evidence relevant to ongoing criminal trials "cut[s] deeply
into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair[s] the
115. See id. at 970.
116. See id. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Smith may have had an alter-
native Sixth Amendment defense. See id. at 970 n.3. The court did not further
discuss the matter because Smith did not assert this right or join the government
in their appeal. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 970 n.3. (citing United States v. Fortna, 796
F.2d 724, 732 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding Sixth Amendment cannot be asserted
vicariously)).
117. See id. at 971 (stating reporters have same responsibility to appear before
grand juries as ordinary citizens). In addition, the court found no empirical evi-
dence supporting WDSU-TV's contention that the media would destroy valuable
archival footage simply to avoid criminal discovery. See id.
118. See id.
119. 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979).
120. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 971.
121. See Riley, 612 F.2d at 710.
122. See id. at 718. In support of its decision, the Third Circuit emphasized
the importance of maintaining autonomy between the courts and the press. See id.
123. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 971. The Fifth Circuit refused to adopt the Riley
view, stating that there is "little persuasive force" in the Third Circuit's distinction
between grand jury and trial proceedings. See id.
124. See id
[Vol. 6: p. 295
20
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol6/iss2/3
1999] MEDIA'S RIGHT TO PROTECT SOURCE INFORMATION 315
basic function of the courts."125 Additionally, the court found that
the Branzburg Court did not intend to limit the balancing test enun-
ciated by Justice Powell to grand jury proceedings. 126 Noting that
evidentiary privileges are generally disfavored, the court reiterated
that the media is subject to the same burden of producing evidence
of criminal wrongdoing as are other members of society. 127
C. Binding Effects of Miller v. Transamerican Press
WDSU-TV also asserted that the Fifth Circuit did not need to
consider the merits of an institutional news reporter's privilege be-
cause the court was bound to apply the privilege that it had estab-
lished in Miller.128 In Miller, the Fifth Circuit upheld a qualified
reporter's privilege in civil libel suits and concluded that the press
interests had outweighed public interests.1 29
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Miller on two
grounds.130 First, the Miller court recognized a qualified reporter's
privilege in civil cases, not criminal.131 In criminal matters, the
public interest in law enforcement usually outweighs the media in-
terest. 13 2 In civil cases, however, the issues are generally of less pub-
125. Id. (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711-12 (1974)). Nixon
dealt primarily with the executive privilege. See generally Nixon, 418 U.S. 683.
126. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 971 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-91). The
Branzburg court found that the public's interest in law enforcement and effective
grand jury proceedings did not override the "consequential, but uncertain, bur-
den" placed on the media's newsgathering function as a result of responding to
grand jury investigations. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 690-91.
127. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 971 (citing Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175
(1979)). Lando involved a "public figure" defamation action in which plaintiff
sought an order compelling discovery. See Herbert v. Lands, 441 U.S. 153, 153
(1979). The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted the discovery motion, but the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. See
id. Finally, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not absolutely
protect newspeople who have allegedly published damaging falsehoods regarding
public figures. See id.
128. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 971 (citing Miller v. Trans American Press, 621 F.2d
721 (5th Cir. 1980)).
129. See Miller v. Trans American Press, 621 F.2d 721, 726-27 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Fifth Circuit held that the compelling need for effective law enforcement is
not present in ci-il cases. Se i& in civil ca-ses, the press is far more likely to be
granted a qualified privilege than in criminal cases because the press' interest in
efficient dissemination of information is more likely to outweigh the interests of
individual civil litigants than the interests of criminal defendants. See id. at 725-26.
130. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 972 (distinguishing Miller because it was a civil
matter and there was no confidentiality issue).
131. For a discussion of the facts of Miller, see supra note 57 and accompany-
ing text.
132. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 972.
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lic concern.' 3 3 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged its prior acceptance
of a privilege in civil cases but refused to extend the Miller privilege
to criminal cases.' 3 4
Second, the court found that Miller, unlike Smith, involved a
privilege not to reveal "confidential" information. 3 5 Relying on
previous Fifth Circuit decisions, the court observed that it had
never recognized a privilege for "non-confidential" outtakes.1 3 6
The court theorized that confidentiality was a prerequisite for the
news reporters' privilege.' 3 7
D. The Fifth Circuit Holding
The Fifth Circuit ultimately held that news reporters do not
possess a qualified privilege protecting "non-confidential" outtakes
relating to criminal trials.' 38 The court determined, therefore, that
the government's burden, under Rule 17(c), was to prove that the
evidence sought was relevant, admissible and specifically identi-
fied.1 3 9 The court held that the government had met this burden
in Smith because multiple contradictory statements by a defendant
can show a "consciousness of guilt."14° Therefore, the court was
entitled to the videotaped footage.'
4
'
133. See id.; see also Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rec-
ognizing a qualified privilege in "civil cases"); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563
F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
134. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 971-72 (citing In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.
1983) (recognizing qualified privilege for confidential sources but permitting over-
ride in civil libel cases)).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. (citing ACLU v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1344 (5th Cir. 1981)). In
Finch, Mississippi residents sued state officials for allegedly violating their First
Amendment rights by conducting surveillance of their lawful activities. See ACLU
v. Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1338 (5th Cir. 1981).
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit compared a newsreporter's confidential interview to
a testimonial privilege, stating that "the existence of a confidential relationship
that the law should foster is critical to the establishment of a privilege." Smith, 135
F.3d at 972; see also Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1022 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990)
(expressing strong doubts whether privilege could exist absent confidentiality).
For a further discussion of Pressey and Finch, see infra notes 174-82 and accompany-
ing text.
138. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 972.
139. See id. Refusing to invoke a privilege, the court reverted to standard dis-
covery rules under Rule 17(c). See id.
140. Id. at 973 (citing United States v. Simone, 205 F.2d 480, 482-83 (2d Cir.
1953) (allowing inference of guilt from multiple contradictory statements)).
141. See id. For a discussion and text of Rule 17(c), see supranotes 76-81 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 6: p. 295
22
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol6/iss2/3
1999] MEDIA'S RIGHT TO PROTECT SOURCE INFORMATION 317
E. Published and Unpublished Information
To determine whether the information was confidential, the
Fifth Circuit looked solely to whether the testimony was given on-
the-record. 142 The court did not consider whether the information
was ultimately published. 143 Access to published or aired interviews
is generally not restricted because there is little argument support-
ing the existence of confidentiality. When an interview is not pub-
lished, however, the question of confidentiality becomes less
clear.' 44 Lower courts within the Fifth Circuit have upheld a privi-
lege based on the distinction between published and unpublished
non-confidential information. 145 In Brinston v. Dunn, the Southern
District of Mississippi did not permit questions relating to unpub-
lished information within the reporter's possession, and limited the
scope of the reporter's deposition questioning to the truthfulness
and accuracy of the statements made within his publication. 146
Other circuits have also expressly adopted the distinction be-
tween published and unpublished information. 147 In United States
v. LaRouche Campaign,148 for example, the First Circuit noted that
compelled discovery could have a chilling effect on First Amend-
ment rights and thus extended a privilege to all unpublished mate-
rial within the reporter's possession, regardless of confidentiality. 149
142. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 972 ("WDSU-TV interviewed Smith 'on-the-record,'
so there was no expectation between Smith and the television station that any of
the information he provided was to be kept in confidence.").
143. See id,
144. See id.
145. See Brinston v. Dunn, 919 F. Supp. 240, 243-44 (S.D. Miss. 1996) (grant-
ing privilege for unpublished, non-confidential source information).
146. See i. at 244. In Brinston, a Mississippi deputy circuit clerk in the Hinds
County Clerk's Office was terminated after announcing his candidacy for the Cir-
cuit Clerk position. See id. at 241. Brinston brought an action against the Circuit
Clerk, Barbara Dunn, alleging that his termination violated his First Amendment
rights. See id. Dunn sought to depose Ernest McBride, a local reporter, who wrote
an article in which Brinston was quoted regarding the inner workings of the
Clerk's Office. See id. McBride filed a motion to quash the subpoena. See Brinston,
919 F. Supp. at 241. The District Court granted the motion in part and denied it
in part, prohibiting questioning pertaining to unpublished work product within
McBride's possession. See id. at 244.
147. See United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (Ist
Cir. 1988) (applying privilege to unpublished non-confidential information);
United States v. Cuthsbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (same); Shoen v.
Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Blanton, 534 F. Supp.
295, 297 (S.D. Fla. 1982), affd, 730 F.2d 1425 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); von Bulow
v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 1987).
148. 841 F.2d 1176 (1st Cir. 1988).
149. See id. at 1181-82. It is important to note, however, that in LaRouche, the
defendant's interests ultimately outweighed the privilege. See id.
23
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Most other circuits disagree with the Fifth Circuit's argument that
confidentiality is a prerequisite to privilege, and instead focus on
the burden that compelled disclosure would place on the news
gathering process. 150 This inquiry comports with Justice Stewart's
dissent and affords adequate protection to all interests involved. 51
V. CRIrricAL ANALYSIs
In Smith, the Fifth Circuit failed to consider the vital role of an
independent free press in American society. 152 The court applied
Justice Powell's concurrence too strictly, and permitted a qualified
privilege solely in government harassment cases.' 53 Although this
approach seems plausible, there are numerous situations where it
could fail to adequately protect legitimate First Amendment inter-
ests. 154 Under the Fifth Circuit approach, law enforcement could
conduct relatively limitless discovery, subject only to procedural
rules and with little regard to the negative impact on newsgather-
ing.' 55 This demonstrates the type of government "annexation" of
the media against which Justice Stewart warned in his Branzburg
dissent.156
150. See id. (applying privilege despite lack of confidentiality); Cuthbertson, 630
F.2d at 147 (same); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1993) (confi-
dentiality is merely one factor to be weighed against competing interest in privi-
lege analysis); Blanton, 534 F. Supp. at 297 (same); von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 143.
151. Lower courts within the Fifth Circuit have also upheld a privilege for
non-confidential information without regard to its publication. For a discussion of
specific lower court opinions within the Fifth Circuit, see infra notes 170-76 and
accompanying text.
152. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(arguingJustice Powell's "crabbed view" of First Amendment underestimated "crit-
ical role" of independent press in American society). For a complete discussion of
Justice Stewart's dissent, see supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
153. See United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Branzburg
will protect the press if the government attempts to harass it. Short of such harass-
ment, the media must bear the same burden of producing evidence of criminal
wrongdoing as any other citizen.").
154. For a complete discussion of the Fifth Circuit's rationale, see supra notes
139-42 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of the procedural rules governing the discovery process,
see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. The media may still successfully
fend off unnecessarily duplicative discovery requests. The burden of proof how-
ever, is on the media to prove duplicity, rather than on the government to prove
why a privilege should be overcome. With the "hands off" attitude often applied to
discovery proceedings, the media would be faced with a much more difficult bur-
den in protecting its First Amendment rights to free press.
156. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart
argued convincingly that denying the media a privilege to protect its sources would
severely undermine the media's "historic independence," by permitting the gov-
ernment to "annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of govern-
ment." Id.
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The Miller test, which the district court adopted, protects First
Amendment rights more than Justice Powell's "harassment" analysis
and does not constrain the government interest in efficient law en-
forcement.1 5 7 The Miller test permits a litigant seeking discovery to
defeat the privilege if he can demonstrate the information: (1) is
relevant; (2) cannot be obtained by alternative means; and (3) is of
compelling interest to the litigation.15 8 This analysis does not con-
fine the privilege to government harassment cases. 15 9 Rather, it bal-
ances all interests involved and encompasses situations in which a
legitimate First Amendment interest may be at stake. 16°
A. Civil and Criminal Matters
In refusing to adopt Miller, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Smith
on two grounds. 16 ' First, the court noted that Miller dealt with a
civil matter, while Smith was criminal in nature. 62 According to the
court, this distinction is important because media interests are
more likely to outweigh government interests in civil cases than in
criminal cases.' 63
The Fifth Circuit refused to subordinate government interests
because effective law enforcement is paramount to the media inter-
est in disseminating information. 16 4 Although government inter-
ests often outweigh media interests in criminal cases, outright
refusal to subject the government to First Amendment scrutiny
could unfairly enable the government to use media resources.'
65
For example, the government could freely benefit from media in-
157. Compare Miller v. Trans American Press, 621 F.2d 721, 725-26 (5th Cir.
1980) (adopting derivative of Justice Stewart's dissent to establish balancing text),
with Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring) (applying privilege solely
to government harassment). The Miller test permits a balancing of all interests
involved, including those of the media, the government and the public. See gener-
ally Miller, 621 F.2d at 725-26.
158. See id. at 726.
159. See id.
160. By balancing the media's interest in informing the public with the gov-
ernment and public's interest in effective law enforcement, it is unlikely that the
criminal justice system will suffer any serious impediment. See id. Such a balancing
would merely shift the burden from the media to the government, to demonstrate
that the evidence sought is not duplicative or available from alternativc sources.
See id.
161. See United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1998).
162. See id. at 972.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. The court refused to balance the government's interests against
those of the media and considered only the government's interest in its analysis.
See Smith, 135 F.3d at 970 n.3.
319
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vestigations. 166 Justice Stewart's test, as adopted in Miller, merely
requires the government to justify its inquiries before burdening
the media with needless or duplicative discovery requests. 1 67 The
Fifth Circuit's distinction between civil and criminal matters trans-
forms the media into a government instrument that aids criminal
prosecutions. 168
B. Confidential and Non-Confidential Information
The Fifth Circuit also distinguished Miller based on confidenti-
ality. 169 In Miller and Selcraig, the Fifth Circuit recognized a privi-
lege protecting confidential sources. 1 70 Unlike Smith, however, the
court did not extend such a privilege to non-confidential out-
takes. 1 7 1 Relying on Pressey v. Patterson1 72 and ACLU v. Finch,1 73 the
court believed that confidentiality was an absolute prerequisite for a
First Amendment privilege. 1 74
The Fifth Circuit's reliance on Pressey demonstrates a misappli-
cation of the facts of that case. In dicta, the Pressey court expressed
reservations about whether a privilege could exist absent confiden-
tiality, but did not directly rule on the issue.' 75 In fact, the Pressey
opinion expressed more concern that the journalist expressly
waived the privilege, than whether the information was
confidential. 1 7
6
166. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725-45 (1972) (arguing failure to
recognize reporter's privilege permits government to "annex" media's resources
for governmental investigative purposes).
167. See Mill, 621 F.2d at 726 (upholding privilege unless litigant proves in-
formation is not available from alternative sources). Such a requirement protects
the media from becoming the government's investigative crutch. See id In situa-
tions where the information could be obtained from other sources, members of
the media should not be forced to expend their time and resources procuring
such information. See id.
168. See id.
169. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 972.
170. See Miller, 621 F.2d at 721.
171. See id. (recognizing privilege as applied to confidential source informa-
tion); In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (same).
172. 898 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1990).
173. 638 F.2d 1336 (5th Cir. 1981). For a complete discussion of the facts of
Finch, see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
174. See Smith, 135 F.3d at 972 (citing Pressey, 898 F.2d at 1022 n.4).
175. See Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 1022 n.4 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Although the question is not directly before us, we have strong doubts whether
the trial judge was correct in enforcing this privilege.... As far as we can discern
from the record, Reiser [the informant] was a divulged source, not a confidential
source. Moreover, Reiser expressly waived the privilege.") (emphasis added).
176. See id.
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The facts of Finch are so different from Smith that its preceden-
tial role is questionable. 177 While it did not directly cite Branzburg,
the Finch court found that state legislatures were free to promulgate
their own privilege statutes to expand First Amendment protec-
tions.178 The opinion focused on whether the state's interest in
sealing the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission records overrode
the government's interest in enforcing federal law.179 The Finch
court ruled on issues of sovereign immunity and did not involve
privileges available to the media.'80 Therefore, Finch's value as a
controlling precedent in the media context appears minimal, par-
ticularly because other courts have directly ruled on the issue. 181
The Fifth Circuit's strict reading of Justice Powell's concur-
rence leaves reporters virtually helpless against interference from
the government. 182 This holding subjects reporters to the poten-
tially burdensome expense of complying with governmental discov-
ery requests and disregards whether such requests are an
impediment to the media's historic independence. 183
VI. IMPACT
The Branzburg plurality opinion perpetuates the divided circuit
court holdings regarding the news reporters' privilege. 184
177. For a discussion of the facts of Finch, see supra note 137.
178. See Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1342-45; see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706 (en-
couraging states to promulgate their own privileges, taking into account specific
issues in their localities).
179. See Finch, 638 F.2d 1336, 1338-39. Finch's declaration that confidentiality
was required to sustain a privilege was not directly addressed to the media. See
generally id.
180. See id.
181. See Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Corp., 633 F.2d 583, 595-
96 (1st Cir. 1980) (ruling directly on existence of privilege in confidential con-
text); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
816 (1983) (same); United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981) (same); LaRouche v. National Broad. Co., 780
F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818 (1986) (same); Miller v.
Transamerican Press, 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041
(1981) (same); Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 992-93 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (same); Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (sam.e); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,
563 F.2d 433, 436-37 (10th Cir. 1977) (same); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (same). But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584-
85 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to acknowledge qualified privilege).
182. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J. dissenting) (asserting that ap-
plication of Justice Powell's view would undermine press' "historic indepen-
dence").
183. See id.
184. See In re Selcraig, 705 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1983) (analyzing Branzburg
plurality). Because many circuits have chosen to adopt Justice Stewart's dissent
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Branzburg and its progeny suggest that the debate over a news re-
porters' privilege for non-confidential source information will not
be resolved in the near future. The division among the circuits is a
result of their fundamentally differing opinions regarding the im-
portance of the media's newsgathering function.18 5 For example,
the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits have traditionally prioritized
the newsgathering function more than the Sixth Circuit, which al-
most completely refuses to extend media privileges. 8 6
While the future of the reporter's privilege within the Fifth Cir-
cuit is uncertain following Smith, it is clear that the Fifth Circuit's
opinion will have a far more reaching impact.18 7 Smith may have
some effect on the producers of investigative reporting pro-
grams. 88 These programs often possess outtakes similar to those in
Smith because they do not air all of their footage. In fact, Smith's
negative impact has already been felt. Prior to Smith, the Second
Circuit recognized a qualified privilege for non-confidential infor-
mation. 189 One recent case, influenced by Smith, demonstrates the
rather than Justice White's opinion or Justice Powell's concurrence, the develop-
ment of reporters' privilege doctrine between circuits has been extremely inconsis-
tent. See Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980).
185. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (StewartJ., dissenting). The circuit courts'
disagreement with Justice Stewart's reverence toward the media is clearly demon-
strated by the various different tests they have applied to determine the reporters'
privilege.
186. Compare von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 1987), (sub-
stantially deferring to media's importance), and Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d at 147
(same) and Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (1995) (same), with In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85 (6th Cir. 1987) (refusing to acknowledge
privilege).
187. Decisions within the Fifth Circuit prior to Smith looked favorably upon
the reporters' privilege. See Brinston v. Dunn, 919 F. Supp. 240, 244 (S.D. Miss.
1996) (affording privilege to all unpublished information); Holland v. Centennial
Homes, Inc., 22 MEDIA L. REP. 2270 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (affording privilege without
regard to confidentiality).
188. See Evidence-Evidentiary Privelge-Second Circuit Refuses to Recognize Journalists'
Privilege For Nonconfidential Information Gonzales v. National Broadcasting Co., 112
HARv. L. REv. 2019 (June 1999). Noting a recent Second Circuit case in which the
news-reporting program Dateline NBC was forced to turn over video outtakes, one
commentator asserted that the "media's warnings about the need for a qualified
privilege for nonconfidential information may prove to be more prescient than the
court surmised." Id. at 2020.
189. See generally National Broad. Co. v. Graco Children Prods., Inc., 79 F.3d
346 (2d Cir. 1996). In Graco, the manufacturer of an infant cradle (Graco) sought
copies of outtakes from an interview with a mother who brought suit against Graco
after her child died while in the cradle. See id. at 349. The mother gave an inter-
view as part of an exposE aired on Dateline NBC, a prime-time investigative report-
ing program on the NBC network. See id. at 348-49. The Second Circuit upheld
the reporter's privilege finding that the outtakes were not "critical or necessary"
and they were never aired. See id. at 352. In an earlier Third Circuit case, CBS
television sought to protect outtakes from an interview taped on their news pro-
[Vol. 6: p. 295
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negative impact Smith is already having on investigative reporting
programs in the Second Circuit.190
In Gonzales v. National Broadcasting Company,191 plaintiffs
brought a claim against a Louisiana Deputy Sheriff for unwarranted
traffic stops based on racial bias.1 92 In January of 1997, NBC's in-
vestigative reporting program, Dateline NBC, broadcast a report de-
tailing similar unwarranted traffic stops, featuring video footage of
the same officers against whom the complaint had been filed. 193
Both parties served subpoenas on NBC, seeking the complete un-
broadcast footage of the incident. 194 NBC refused to comply, citing
the First Amendment journalists' privilege.19 5 NBC argued, as in
Smith, that without a reporter's privilege for such outtakes, the press
would be subject to a flood of subpoenas, forcing journalists to be
participants in litigation. 196 The Second Circuit rejected this argu-
ment, citing Smith, and found that the First Amendment did not
protect the press from what it considered an "incidental"
burden. 19
7
As large scale media events such as the O.J. Simpson trial and
the Monica Lewinski affair bring the reporters' privilege into sharp
focus, perhaps the Fifth Circuit will reassess its views on the impor-
tance of an independent media and possibly expand the currently
sparse case law pertaining to a reporter's privilege and non-confi-
dential source information. Until that day, reporters around the
country will continue to bear the burden of serving as witnesses and
gatherers of information for potential litigants.
Michael Fitzsimmons
gram 60 Minutes. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 142 (3d Cir.
1980). The court held that journalists have a qualified privilege. See id. at 147.
190. See Gonzales v. National Broad. Co., 155 F.3d 618 (2d Cir. 1998).
191. See id.
192. See id, Plaintiffs alleged that they had been stopped and detained with-
out probable cause. See id. at 619.
193. See id. at 620.
194. See Gonzales, 155 F.3d at 620.
195. See id& A district court ordered the disclosure of the outtakes. See id.
196. See id at 625.
197. See itt (quoting United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 970 (5th Cir.
1998)).
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